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SUBSISTENCE & STURGEON: 




In March 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided Sturgeon v. Frost, 
unanimously holding navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks are 
exempt from the Park Service’s normal regulatory authority. The result of the
Court’s holding has stifled federal law enforcement in Alaska. An overly 
cautious interpretation of Sturgeon could jeopardize federal enforcement in its
entirety on the thousands of miles of navigable rivers in Alaska. However,
considered in the broader context of the history of Alaskan subsistence rights
and corresponding jurisprudence, there is ample legal footing in the Sturgeon 
opinion to provide federal law enforcement personnel with authority to enforce 
subsistence fishing regulations, as opposed to the navigation-based hovercraft
regulation at issue in Sturgeon. Should a future challenge arise, the Supreme 
Court would likely uphold the Department of Interior’s authority to enforce
federal subsistence fishing regulations on navigable waterways in Alaska.
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sturgeon v. Frost, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
held that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (ANILCA)1 forbids the National Park Service from 
enforcing the Service’s hovercraft rule on navigable waterways in
Alaska’s national parks.2 The Court’s decision can be summarized in a 
simple syllogism. The National Park Service’s hovercraft rule applies only
to public lands. The navigable waterways in Alaska’s federal lands—also
known in Alaska as conservation system units (CSUs)—are not public 
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§§ 3101–3233 (2018).
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180 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
lands. Thus, the hovercraft rule does not apply to these waterways. How 
the Court reaches this conclusion, unsurprisingly, is more complex, 
reflecting the tension between Alaskan and federal control and ultimately
highlighting why “Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.”3 
Passed in 1980, ANILCA divided land in Alaska between the state 
and federal governments by formally preserving 104 million acres of
federal land in Alaska and incorporating them into the Park Service as 
new and existing CSUs.4 Critical to the Sturgeon decision, these CSUs 
“follow[ed] topographic or natural features, rather than enclos[ing] only 
federal owned lands.”5 This meant more than 18 million acres of so-called
“inholdings”—i.e., State, Native, and private land—”wound up inside” 
Alaska’s CSUs.6 ANILCA also notably furthered the interests of Alaska 
Natives, a key party to the negotiation, by explicitly providing for 
subsistence rights.7 This provision also effectuated the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act,8 which had been passed nine years earlier to 
resolve aboriginal land claims.9 
The central issue in Sturgeon hinged on interpreting ANILCA section
103(c), which according to the Court, “expressly exempts all those non-
public lands (the inholdings) from certain regulations.”10 Because the title
to the land beneath navigable waterways belongs to the State of Alaska, 
the Court held that “Alaska, not the United States, has title” and 
corresponding enforcement authority.11 The Court did not find any 
exception that would permit enforcement of the Park Service’s hovercraft 
rule, and therefore the statutory language of 103(c) exempting non-public 
3. Id. at 1080 (internal quotation omitted). 
4. Id. at 1075 (describing the history, purpose, and meaning of ANILCA); see
also ANILCA § 3101 (describing the Act’s overarching purpose). 
5. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1075–76 (internal quotations omitted). 
6. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
7. ANILCA § 3101(c) (“It is further the intent and purpose of this Act . . . to 
provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to
continue to do so.”).
8. Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1629 (2018)). 
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (“[T]here is an immediate need for a fair and just
settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska, based on 
aboriginal land claims. . . .”); see generally Gavin Kentch, A Corporate Culture? The
Environmental Justice Challenges of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 81 MISS.
L.J. 813, 816–17 (2012) (discussing how the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
“resolved aboriginal land claims by conveying to Native groups fee simple title to 
roughly forty-four million acres” of the state’s 365 million acres “so that oil 
development could go forward”).
10. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1077. 
11. Id. at 1078; see also United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)
(“Ownership of submerged lands—which carries with it the power to control
navigation, fishing, and other public uses of water—is an essential attribute of 
sovereignty.”).
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 1812019 SUBSISTENCE & STURGEON
lands was conclusive: Jim Sturgeon could “rev up his hovercraft in search
of moose.”12 
In a significant footnote, however, the Court referenced a series of
Ninth Circuit decisions known collectively as the Katie John trilogy,13 and 
explicitly held that Sturgeon does “not disturb the Ninth Circuit’s [Katie 
John decisions’] holdings that the Park Service may regulate subsistence 
fishing on navigable waters.”14 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence (joined 
only by Justice Ginsburg) also noted additional ways in which the 
majority’s holding is actually much narrower in application. She pointed 
out key exceptions where federal enforcement is still likely allowed, such 
as on navigable waters “adjunct to [the Park Service’s] authority over the
parks themselves,”15 as well as on Alaska’s 26 Wild  and Scenic  Rivers  
given “Congress’ highly specific definition” of them, which “overrides”
section 103(c).16 
Because of the Katie John footnote and Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence, Sturgeon has caused tangible enforcement difficulties in 
Alaska: the extent of the Department of Interior’s (DOI) jurisdiction on 
Alaska’s navigable waterways is unclear.17 While the prohibition on 
hovercrafts is clearly proscribed . . . , the level of applicable generality is 
in question. One such issue of application that is of major concern to
Alaskans is subsistence rights. Whereas hovercraft use is anomalous, 
approximately 95 percent of rural Alaska households use fish for
subsistence purposes.18 Moreover, the questionable enforcement 
authority pertains to a vast amount of land. The DOI alone manages 220 
million acres of Alaska—more than 60 percent of the state.19 For context, 
12. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1073. 
13. Alaska v. Babbitt (Katie John I), 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
517 U.S. 1187 (1996); John v. United States (Katie John II), 247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc); John v. United States (Katie John III), 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1042 (2014). For historical background on Katie John, an 
Ahtna Athabaskan Indian, and her role in the litigation, see Native American 
Rights Fund, Katie John – Her Life and Legacy, NARF.ORG, 
https://www.narf.org/cases/katie-john-v-norton/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
14. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1080 n.2.
 15. Id. at 1091 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
16. Id. at 1093 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
17. Though Sturgeon only discusses the Park Service, the federal lands 
implicated are also managed by additional arms of the Department of the Interior, 
such as Bureau of Land Management and Fish and Wildlife. 
18. ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, ALASKA’S SUBSISTENCE FISHERIES DATABASE
(2011), https://seagrant.uaf.edu/events/2011/wakefield-people/presentations/
lemons-alaska-subsistence-fisheries-database.pdf.
19. As of 2015, federal possession of Alaska under the Department of Interior
breaks down as follows: Bureau of Land Management, 74.7 million acres; Wildlife
Refuges, 69.4 million acres; National Parks, 53.8 million acres; National Forest, 
21.9 million acres. An additional 2.2 million acres is managed by the Department








    














     
  
   
 








182 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
that is roughly the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined.20 Given the 
importance of subsistence rights to rural Alaskans and the enormous scale 
of land subject to federal regulation, proper preservation of subsistence 
rights is paramount. 
The question, then, is whether there is still legal authority to continue
enforcing any federal regulations on Alaska’s navigable waterways, and 
if so, what is the scope of that enforcement authority? The answer is yes, 
federal agents still have a key role to play in enforcement on these rivers, 
particularly in the area of subsistence fishing rights. Moreover,
enforcement authority is still on firm legal footing after Sturgeon. 
II. ENFORCEMENT: NAVIGATION VS. SUBSISTENCE
Rivers in Alaska are unlike those in the rest of the Lower Forty-Eight. 
Both their navigation- and subsistence-based utility distinguish them. As 
the Court aptly noted, “rivers function as the roads of Alaska, to an extent
unknown anyplace else in the country.”21 This remote accessibility is due 
to the fact that “[o]ver three-quarters of Alaska’s 300 communities and 
roughly twenty percent of its 735,000 residents live in regions
unconnected to the road system.”22 Consequently, rivers are essential for 
travel. 
The other critical facet of Alaska rivers’ uniqueness is their use for 
subsistence fishing. ANILCA protects the “[s]ubsistence way of life for 
rural residents,”23 where subsistence uses are defined as “customary and 
traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of wild, renewable resources for
direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, 
tools, or transportation.”24 In rural Alaska, there is often no alternative to
of Defense. CHUCK BURNHAM, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH SERVS., FEDERAL 
LANDS IN ALASKA AND LAND TRANSFERS UNDER THE STATEHOOD ACT (2015),
http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=29&docid=2870. For 
context of federal ownership in other states and a map of federal ownership in 
Alaska, see CAROL H. VINCENT ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL
LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 4–6, 15 (2017). 
20. Texas is 168,217,600 acres, and Oklahoma is 44,087,680 acres. Vincent et
al., supra note 19, at 8.
 21. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1087; see also Brief for National Parks Conservation 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, Sturgeon, 139 S. 
Ct. 1066 (No. 17-949) [hereinafter Brief for National Parks Conservation 
Association et al.] (“In many parks in Alaska, the navigable rivers form the major
transportation corridors, akin to roads in the parks in the contiguous United 
States. For example, the Yukon River in the Preserve is how the majority of visitors 
travel through the Preserve.”).
22. Brief for the State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, 
Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (No. 17-949) [hereinafter Brief for Alaska]. 
23.  ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (2018). 
24. Id. § 3113. 
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 1832019 SUBSISTENCE & STURGEON
the food supply that subsistence rights provide.25 And to underscore the 
significance of these rights, Congress prioritized subsistence uses of 
wildlife over other consumptive uses in ANILCA.26 Accordingly, a major
reason “to give the State and Natives assurance that their [lands] 
wouldn’t be treated just like federally owned property” was the
complexity of carefully negotiated subsistence rights.27 
The Court held in Sturgeon that federal enforcement of a hovercraft 
rule on navigable waterways running through federal land is contrary to 
the statutory language of ANILCA. However, when considered through 
the framework of Alaska rivers’ uniqueness—navigation versus 
subsistence—it becomes clear that the Court only intended to limit federal
enforcement with regard to regulating navigation, such as a hovercraft
prohibition. A clear distinction can be drawn as to subsistence rights for
the following reasons: 1) the careful negotiation of subsistence rights by 
Alaska Natives in ANILCA Title VIII means federal reserved water rights 
are part of “public lands” for subsistence, but not navigation regulation; 
2) a “tragedy of the commons” is only inherent to subsistence rights; and 
3) the high water mark line is only administrable as a meaningful
enforcement distinction for navigation regulation. 
A. Reserved Water Rights & Title VIII
Returning to the introductory syllogism, the lack of enforcement 
authority hinges on navigable waters not being public lands. Reserved
water rights, however, transform such waterways into public lands for 
the purposes of subsistence rights. Understanding how reserved water
rights could constitute public lands for subsistence but not navigation 
regulation requires returning to Katie John I. 
25. Id. § 3111(2); see also E. Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence
Rights, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 47, 63–64 (2010) (discussing the ways in which 
climate change contributes to food scarcity for Alaska Natives and the impact on 
subsistence); Sophie Thériault et al., The Legal Protection of Subsistence: A 
Prerequisite of Food Security for the Inuit of Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 35, 55–58 (2005) 
(demonstrating that subsistence foods are a “precondition for Inuit food
security”).
26. ANILCA § 3114 (“[T]he taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for 
nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such 
lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes.”). Congress also declared as much 
in ANILCA’s statement of policy. Id. § 3112(2). 
27. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1076 (internal quotations omitted). For further 
history on the development of the rural priority in ANILCA, see Miranda Strong, 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act Compliance & Nonsubsistence Areas:
How Can Alaska Thaw Out Rural & Alaska Native Subsistence Rights?, 30 ALASKA L.
REV. 71, 73–77 (2013). For further discussion of federal statutory obligations 
Alaska Natives have negotiated, see Ristroph, supra note 25, at 67–75. 
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Faced with the issue of whether navigable waters are subject to 
ANILCA’s subsistence priority, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district 
court’s expansive definition,28 instead limiting the subsistence priority to
“navigable waters in which the United States has reserved water rights.”29 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that in reserving large parcels of Alaska
land through “a myriad of statutes,” the United States had “implicitly
reserved appurtenant waters, including appurtenant navigable waters, to 
the extent needed to accomplish the purposes of the reservations”—in 
this case effectuating the subsistence priority.30 Consequently, the court 
“impose[d] an extraordinary administrative burden on federal agencies”
to identify the waters in which there was a reserved water right.31 
The DOI subsequently amended its ANILCA subsistence
regulations to conform to Katie John I, such that the subsistence 
management program applied to activities “occurring on inland 
navigable waters in which the United States has a reserved water right.”32 
The DOI also enumerated specific federal land units in which reserved 
water rights exist.33 Moreover, this justification for the identification of 
subsistence rights still has support from the Ninth Circuit. In its 2013 
decision in Katie John III, the Ninth Circuit upheld the federal 
government’s inclusion of waters in which DOI had identified reserved
water rights in the definition of public lands for the purposes of
subsistence.34 
The Court in Sturgeon contrasted this approach to reserved water 
28. The district court held that the subsistence priority applied to all
navigable waters because the federal government’s navigational servitude defines 
the scope of public lands, all navigable waters are subject to the servitude, and
thus all navigable waters qualify as public lands. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
construction as overly broad because a navigational servitude is not a property 
interest to which the United States can hold title. Katie John I, 72 F.3d 698, 702–03 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
29. Id. at 700. 
30. Id. at 703. The court further delineated the statutes at issue, writing
“[t]hese statutes include, but are not limited to, acts reserving land for national 
parks, forests and wildlife preserves, the Statehood Act, the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act and ANILCA itself.” Id. at 703 n.10. 
31. Id. at 704. 
32.  64 Fed. Reg. 1276, 1276 (Jan. 8, 1999) (codified at 50 C.F.R. Pt. 100). 
33. 50 C.F.R. § 100.3(c) (2019) (listing 30 areas of federal land, notably
including the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve at issue in Sturgeon).
34. Katie John III, 720 F.3d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Furthermore, federal 
reserved water rights can reach waters that lie on inholdings as long as those  
waters, based on their location and proximity to federal lands, are or may become
necessary for the primary purposes of the federally reserved land. Because these
water bodies are actually situated within the boundaries of federal reservations, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the United States has an interest in such waters 
for the primary purposes of the reservations. We therefore uphold the Secretaries’
inclusion of these waters within ‘public lands.’”). 
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rights. In Sturgeon, the Supreme Court ruled that navigable waters in
Alaska CSUs do not qualify as “public lands” for the purposes of the 
hovercraft ban because the United States’ water rights are “usufructuary,” 
not ownership rights, and do not vest title in the affected waters in the 
government.35 In dicta, the Court reasoned that even if the government 
has an interest in navigable waters by virtue of the reserved water rights
doctrine, that interest would only authorize regulation to restrict 
depletion or diversion of the water, not regulations that do not relate to 
safeguarding the water, such as restrictions on hovercraft use.36 
Nonetheless, the reserved water rights argument—which the Court 
dismissed in Sturgeon as a basis for federal authority to enforce the Park 
Service’s navigation-based hovercraft rule—will likely prevail with 
regard to the issue of federal regulation of subsistence fishing rights. 
Indeed, the Court strongly implied as much in its decision.
The reserved water rights argument in the context of subsistence 
rights—as first laid out in Katie John I and further developed in Katie John 
III—is meaningfully different than the potential application of reserved
water rights to non-subsistence uses. Recall that ANILCA was a
compromise not only between the state of Alaska and the federal 
government, but also Alaska Natives.37 Title VIII of ANILCA accordingly 
protected Alaska Natives’ subsistence rights (and expanded those rights
to include similarly-situated, non-Native rural Alaskans) because “no 
practical alternative means are available to replace the food supplies and
other items gathered from fish and wildlife which supply rural residents 
dependent on subsistence uses.”38 Given this explicit provision within 
Title VIII of ANILCA, although federal reserved water rights clearly are 
no longer part of the definition of “public land” as relevant for navigation 
regulation post Sturgeon, the federal reserved water rights uniquely
qualify as public land for the purposes of Title VIII as relevant for 
subsistence rights.39 
This point was implicitly accepted in Sturgeon when the Court 
concluded its discussion of the reserved water rights argument with the
35.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1079 (2019). 
36. Id.
 37. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text; see also Ristroph, supra note
25, at 67–69 (discussing how statutory protections of Alaska Natives’ subsistence
rights differ from treaties with Native Americans in the Lower Forty-Eight).
38. ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3111(2) (2018). Colloquially, subsistence rights are
still often referred to as Title VIII, as laid out in the original public law. See Pub. L.
96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
39. Congress further effectuated this understanding that subsistence rights 
were pursuant to reserved water rights. See Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence 
Users as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19–21, Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066
(No. 17-949) [hereinafter Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence Users]. 
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Katie John carve out.40 Numerous parties’ briefs—even those that
generally argued against federal oversight—also endorsed this 
argument.41 The state of Alaska wrote in its amicus brief supporting the
petitioner, “This case presents a salient example of a circumstance where 
a complex statute’s use of a term in different contexts is properly 
interpreted differently.”42 Accordingly, the state urged the Court not to
disturb Katie John because subsistence is “the lifeblood of cultural, 
spiritual, economic, and physical well-being” for Alaska Natives, and
therefore the Katie John decisions “effectuate[d] Congress’ intent” to
“protect the important values embodied by subsistence.”43 
Perhaps most demonstrative is that at least some Alaska Natives—a 
critical party to the negotiation of ANILCA—believe subsistence rights
have a unique meaning within the context of Title VIII as opposed to the
rest of the statute.44 This position is most clearly laid out in the amicus
brief of Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Native Regional Corporation representing 
approximately 2,000 Ahtna Athabascan native people.45 In their brief, 
filed in support of neither party, the Ahtna corporation described how
Alaska Natives have been “forced to litigate frequently to protect their
customary and traditional way of life,” often because of ANILCA’s
complexity.46 Accordingly, although the statute’s use of the term “public 
lands” is, at best, muddled, there is “no debate that federal management 
40. See Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1080 n.2. 
41. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 34 n.4, Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (No. 17-
949) (“Title VIII supports an array of subsistence management regulations that are
beyond the scope of Mr. Sturgeon’s challenge. The focus of Mr. Sturgeon’s
challenge is instead the Ninth Circuit’s decision to expand the reasoning of the
Katie John cases beyond subsistence and, in so doing, grant NPS plenary control 
over State waterways.”); Brief for Alaska, supra note 22, at 29–35 (“Nor should the 
Katie John and Sturgeon decisions be tied together as the Ninth Circuit has done. 
Title VIII stands apart from the rest of ANILCA with its own findings, its own
statement of policy, and—unlike any other part of the legislation—specific
invocations of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, the Property 
Clause, and Congress’s ‘constitutional authority over Native affairs.’” (citations
omitted)). But see Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence Users, supra note 39, at 22– 
23 (“There is no separate definition of “public lands” for purposes of Title VIII of
ANILCA governing subsistence uses.”). 
42.  Brief for Alaska, supra note 22, at 34. 
43. Id. at 31–33. 
44. Though there were other Alaska Native amici who did not support the 
dual meaning of public lands within the context of subsistence, it is critical to note 
their argument was made in support of respondents, not petitioners. In other words,
it was framed under the umbrella that “amici support all efforts to recognize and
preserve the Katie John decisions.” Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence Users, supra
note 39, at 23. 
45. Brief for Ahtna, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 1, 
Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (No. 17-949) [hereinafter Brief for Ahtna]. 
46. Id. at 28–29 (“As evidenced by the extensive litigation ANILCA has
spawned, the balance Congress struck in ANILCA is difficult to manage.”).
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 1872019 SUBSISTENCE & STURGEON
authority over navigable waters must extend as far as necessary to
effectuate the subsistence preference in Title VIII.”47 
The Ahtna corporation argued in its brief that Title VIII—and its 
reliance on federal reserved water rights to protect subsistence rights as 
decided in Katie John I—stands on its own compared to the rest of the 
statute. Most significantly, the Ahtna corporation argued that Title VIII 
relies on a unique definition of the term “public lands” compared to the
rest of the statute. Though typical statutory interpretation dictates the
same term takes on a singular meaning within a statute, in the case of
ANILCA, multiple definitions of the term “public lands” is plausible. 
“ANILCA ‘is far from a chef d’oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship’”
meaning that “no court should presume that ‘identical words used in
different parts of the same statute are intended to have the same 
meaning.’”48 It is therefore within reason that federal reserved water 
rights are part of public lands for the purposes of subsistence, but not 
navigation regulation. Furthermore, Title VIII can be construed uniquely 
because within ANILCA, Congress singularly invoked its Commerce 
Clause authority in the context of Title VIII, not anywhere else.49 
As an integral party to ANILCA, Alaska Natives’ understanding 
of—and reliance on—subsistence rights should be given special attention.
Reserved water rights have no bearing on the construction of “public 
lands” as relevant for navigation regulation, such as the hovercraft ban. 
But in the context of Title VIII, reserved water rights can justify the 
protection of subsistence rights as laid out in the Katie John trilogy. 
B. Tragedy of the Commons 
Natural resource protection is vital to Alaska.50 Consequently, a key 
tension in Alaska is short- versus long-term resource management.51 The 
47. Id. at 30. 
48. Id. at 32 (citing Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 319–20
(2014)).
49. See ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (2018); see also Brief for the Petitioner,
supra note 41, at 70 (“In ANILCA, Congress invoked its Commerce Clause power 
only for purposes of authorizing subsistence regulation. . . . Congress did not, 
however, invoke the Commerce Clause to justify any of the other provisions of
ANILCA.”).
50. For example, the value of Alaska salmon alone was $595.6 million in 2018. 




51. This tension between short- and long-term resource management is
pervasive in Alaska. Consider, for example, the current political debate over the
state’s annual permanent fund dividend (PFD). See Richard Feloni, Alaska’s
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federal government has an obligation to ensure that the subsistence 
rights, as negotiated in ANILCA, remain in perpetuity.52 A tragedy of the
commons is not just a hypothetical; part of the reason why Alaska wanted 
statehood in the first place was overfishing.53 Relatedly, climate change— 
the paradigmatic tragedy of the commons example has already
manifested itself in Alaska, threatening the long-term viability of 
subsistence.54 Navigable waters in CSUs, which rural communities 
disproportionately rely on, are prone to the distinct and real possibility of
overfishing or permanent contamination.55 Subsistence regulation
accordingly protects against this danger. 
In contrast, navigation regulations do not address the same tragedy 
of the commons type of concerns. Too many hovercrafts—or as is more 
plausibly the case, too many boats—navigating one of these rivers does
Republican Governor Wants to Give Every Resident More Than $4,000 for the Next 3
Years, but Not Everyone Is Happy, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/alaska-permanent-fund-dividend-political-
debate-2019-2, (“Polling has shown that the majority of Alaskans have long 
favored the fund, but Permanent Fund Defenders founder Juanita Cassellius said
that as the political debates over the fund and the dividend increase in intensity,
the fund needs protection.”); see also Lori Townsend, The PFD Debate, ALASKA
PUBLIC MEDIA (June 28, 2019), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2019/06/28/the-
pfd-debate, (interviewing two Alaska state senators to discuss the long-term 
future of the PFD).
52. ANILCA § 3112(2) (declaring “nonwasteful subsistence uses of fish and 
wildlife . . . shall be the priority consumptive uses of all such resources . . . to 
assure the continued viability of a fish or wildlife population or the continuation
of subsistence uses”). 
53. See Katie John III, 720 F.3d 1214, 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Among the major 
reasons why Alaskans sought statehood was that federal regulation of territorial 
waters allowed non-Alaskan commercial firms to take salmon in ‘fish traps,’
which starved local Alaskans of the catch and threatened the salmon runs. . . . 
Between 1936 and 1959, when federal management of Alaska’s salmon finally 
ended, production had fallen from 8.5 million cases annually to 1.8 million 
cases.”).
54. See Ristroph, supra note 25, at 52–61 (outlining the numerous ways in 
which climate change has already negatively impacted Alaska and the 
corresponding threats to subsistence, particularly for Alaska Natives on the North 
Slope); E. Barrett Ristroph, Still Melting: How Climate Change and Subsistence Laws 
Constrain Alaska Native Village Adaptation, 30 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 264–66 (2019) (“Nearly half of [Alaskan Native Village]
participants spoke about threats to subsistence that they had to deal with in 
addition to climate change.”). 
55. One of the most prominent examples in Alaska history being the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill. See  JAMES A. FALL, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH & GAME DIVISION OF
SUBSISTENCE, SUBSISTENCE AFTER THE SPILL: USES OF FISH AND WILDLIFE IN ALASKA 
NATIVE VILLAGES AND THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 23–24 (Feb. 1991) (“The
dominant oil spill-related reason for lower harvests was fear that subsistence 
foods had been contaminated by the oil. . . . In addition, reports of dead wildlife 
and other signs warning of danger led many people to doubt that their traditional 
harvest areas were safe to use and traditional foods were safe to eat.”). 

















   
 
    
 
  




   
 
 
   
 
  
 1892019 SUBSISTENCE & STURGEON
not prompt the same necessity to conserve resources long term. 
Furthermore, from a pragmatic standpoint, given the small size of
Alaska’s population relative to its geographic footprint, the likelihood of 
just a single person potentially disturbing a river such that it is no longer 
suitable for subsistence fishing is far greater than any likelihood of 
overuse via navigation.56 
One counterargument is that Alaska state authorities, rather than
federal agents, could seemingly just as effectively ensure the protection of 
these subsistence rights. If resource conservation is the primary 
motivating concern, leave it to state enforcement. To that point, the Court 
specifically noted that the federal government may “enter into
‘cooperative agreements’ with the State (which holds the rivers’
submerged lands) to preserve the rivers themselves.”57 
The issue with this counterargument is that Alaska constitutionally 
cannot live up to ANILCA’s statutory duty. Recall, ANILCA subsistence 
rights specifically enumerate protections for rural residents.58 ANILCA 
even has language deferring to the state for enforcement of those 
protections, and originally, the state did in fact handle such 
enforcement.59 In 1989, however, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded in 
McDowell v. State that the rural subsistence priority conflicted with the
Alaska State Constitution’s provisions pertaining to equal common use of
fish and game.60 Oversight of subsistence hunting and fishing rights on 
federal lands accordingly reverted to the federal government, thereby
effectuating “Congress’s discrete intent that there be an enforceable 
subsistence priority” in some form.61 
Today, the federal government could enter into cooperative
56. Unsurprisingly, Alaska has the smallest population per square mile of
any state in the country: only 1.2 people per square mile. In comparison,
Wyoming, the 49th smallest state, has 5.8 people per square mile. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS: POPULATION DENSITY DATA (2018), https:/
/www.census.gov/data/tables/2010/dec/density-data-text.html. 
57.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1086 (2019). 
58.  ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (2018); see also Strong, supra note 27, at 75–77 
(overviewing the origin of the rural priority).
59. See Katie John III, 720 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2013) (“ANILCA states that
the Secretaries should not take action to implement Title VIII if Alaska ‘enacts and 
implements laws of general applicability which are consistent with’ ANILCA’s 
rural subsistence priority requirements. In other words, ANILCA expresses a 
preference for state management of the rural subsistence priority. . . .”) (citing 
16 U.S.C. § 3115(d)); see also Strong, supra note 27, at 78–83 (detailing the history 
of the state’s failure to maintain the rural priority). 
60. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989) (“We hold only that the 
residency criterion used in the 1986 act which conclusively excludes all urban 
residents from subsistence hunting and fishing regardless of their individual
characteristics is unconstitutional.”). 
61.  Brief for Alaska, supra note 22, at 31. 






















    
 
 
190 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2
agreements with the state to take over enforcement of regulations such as 
the hovercraft rule, per the Court’s recommendation. The state, however, 
could not enforce rural subsistence rights as protected and prioritized by 
ANILCA through a cooperative agreement because of the state 
constitutional bar—unless Alaska amends it state constitution or 
Congress amends ANILCA, both of which having been recommended by
the judiciary.62 Thus, until such amendment occurs, federal enforcement 
of subsistence rights is the only means available to protect subsistence 
rights and ensure no tragedy of the commons materializes. 
C. High Water Mark
In pointing out ways to still protect rivers, the Court noted “[t]he 
Park Service may at a minimum regulate the public lands flanking 
rivers.”63 Such regulation is based on a “high water mark” rule, which, as
applied to the enforcement of navigation regulations, presents a workable 
bright line for federal agents and officers because the division between 
navigation on land versus water is clear.64 There is no concern about the
actual location of the mean high water mark when dealing with 
navigation-based activity. Any boat on a river—or in the case of Sturgeon,
a hovercraft on the river—is unquestionably operating below that high 
water mark since the activity necessarily occurs above water. On the other 
hand, that same boundary as applied to the enforcement of subsistence 
fishing regulations becomes indeterminate and unworkable.
For example, if a subsistence fisher is standing above the high water
mark, but her lure is in the water, is federal enforcement authority based
on the spot where the fisher is standing or the location of the lure? 
Alternatively, in a similar manner to Justice Sotomayor’s hypothetical, if 
a fisher tosses toxic waste from the riverbank into the river itself, does the 
62. See, e.g., Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1094 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (“Congress
can and should clarify the broad scope of the Service’s authority over Alaska’s 
navigable waters.”); Katie John I, 72 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The issue raised 
by the parties cries out for a legislative, not a judicial, solution. If the Alaska
Legislature were to amend the state constitution or otherwise comply with 
ANILCA’s rural subsistence priority, the state could resume management of 
subsistence uses on public lands including navigable waters. . . . If Congress were
to amend ANILCA, it could clarify both the definition of public lands and its
intent. Only legislative action by Alaska or Congress will truly resolve the 
problem.”).
63. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1086. 
64. The Park Service’s regulations are applicable to “navigable waters and 
areas within their ordinary reach (up to the mean high water line in places subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide and up to the ordinary high water mark in other 
places).” 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3) (2019). 
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federal agent lose enforcement authority?65 Or what if the potential  
violator has one foot above the high water mark and the other foot below? 
Even if clear answers could be fashioned to these hypotheticals, another 
problem arises from the difficulty in discerning where exactly along the 
riverbank the mean high water mark lies.66 Add in the hostility of many 
Alaskans to even the faintest notion of federal oversight, and the 
boundary becomes increasingly unworkable in the context of actual 
enforcement.67 
These questions are not just theoretical. They undoubtedly impact 
decisions made by federal enforcement in the field. Take the following 
situation that could very well be encountered on a river like the one at 
issue in Sturgeon: an agent comes across an angry Alaska fisherman who 
wants to blow fish out of the water with dynamite, and the fisherman is
standing a foot above the mean high water mark. Assuming the agent
even knows where the high water mark is, can she stop the fisherman?”68 
Moreover, the ambiguity in discerning the precise location of the mean 
high water mark is not only problematic for federal agents, but also for 
the subsistence fishers who are looking to comply with the law. 
When viewed through the lens of a rule as opposed to a standard, 
using the high water mark as a meaningful dividing line is only an 
65. See Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1090 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (“[R]eading 
ANILCA § 103(c) to bar any Park Service regulation of navigable waters would 
permit [citizens] to evade those rules entirely if she were to wade into the river or
paddle along the bank in a canoe.”); see also Brief for National Parks Conservation 
Association et al., supra note 21, at 21 (“The Park Service may be unable . . . to
prevent the dumping of trash or fuel into the waterway, or to enforce subsistence 
hunting and fishing regulations when violations occur on the water.”). 
66. Even experienced federal agents can have trouble discerning the high
water mark. See Frank E. Maloney, The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at
Settling an Unsettled Boundary Line, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 465, 466 (1978) 
(“Ironically, the determination of the [ordinary high water line] is as confused as
it is important.”).
67. For an example of such hostility, consider the locally well-known case of 
Jim Wilde. Federal agents attempted to perform a safety inspection on Wilde’s 
boat and he resisted, forcing the rangers to pull out a shotgun to convince Wilde 
to head to the riverbank where he “began walking toward the Rangers with
clenched fists, yelling profanities.” United States v. Wilde, 4:10-CR-21 RRB, 2013 
WL 6237704, at *1–2 (D. Alaska Dec. 3, 2013), aff’d, 585 Fed. Appx. 336 (9th Cir. 
2014) (unpublished).
68. See Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1090–91 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (“Imagine if 
all Service regulations could apply in Alaska’s parklands only up to the banks of 
navigable rivers, and the Service lacked any authority whatsoever over the rivers 
themselves. If Jane Smith were to stand on the public bank of the Nation River,
bag of trash in hand, Service rules could prohibit her from discarding the trash on
the riverbank. . . . But reading ANILCA § 103(c) to bar any Park Service regulation 
of navigable waters would permit Jane to evade those rules entirely if she were to
wade into the river or paddle along the bank in a canoe.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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administrable rule in the context of navigational regulation.69 Conversely, 
such a rule fails in the context of subsistence rights. The Court’s reliance
on this boundary between the riverbank and river is further evidence of
why the Court explicitly carved out subsistence fishing rights from its 
holding: the decision implicitly recognizes that navigation enforcement 
based on the high water mark is substantively different from subsistence 
enforcement. 
III. CONCLUSION
Even though there is a theoretical distinction between navigation 
and subsistence regulation enforcement, tough cases will still arise. 
Consider United States v. Wilde, a quintessentially Alaska case which
turned on the question of whether the National Park Service has 
“jurisdiction on the Yukon River to stop vessels in order to conduct safety 
inspections.”70 Framed in the paradigm of navigation versus subsistence
use, in which category does a safety inspection qualify? Though the
answer is not necessarily clear, such difficult questions should be ones of
application between discrete categories, not questions of whether
enforcement is an issue as a first principle. 
Ultimately, when viewed within the framework of navigation versus 
subsistence rights, the Court’s opinion in Sturgeon clearly lays out a path
for still enforcing subsistence regulations. The Court’s decision to carve
out the Katie John trilogy was purposeful, and the Secretary of the Interior
has strong legal grounds to ensure the federal government will continue
to protect subsistence rights. 
69. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985)
(discussing the theoretical arguments underpinning the “stereotyped, almost 
caricatured, forms of arguments” related to rules versus standards).
70. Wilde, 2013 WL 6237704 at *2. 
